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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION RULE ON THE
PRESERVATION OF CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES-WHAT PRICE PROTECTION?
INTRODUCTION
When a consumer contracts to purchase an item such as a
household appliance, he may sign a separate promissory note
evidencing his credit arrangement with the retail seller. The
seller, in turn, often discounts' this note to a finance company,
which will take over collection of the debt. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code the finance company is considered a holder
in due course (HDC) if it takes the note for value, in good faith,
and without knowledge of any defenses the consumer may have
against the seller.2 A holder in due course takes the contract
free of any personal defenses the signer of the note would have
against the original seller.' Thus, if the appliance breaks down
and the consumer is unsuccessful in his attempts to secure
redress from the seller, he will probably stop payments on the
note. The financer, asserting HDC status, can demand that the
consumer complete his obligation regardless of complaints the
1. A note is "discounted" when it is purchased for a price less than its face value.
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(1) [hereinafter cited as UCC] provides:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored
or of any defense or claim to it on the part of any person.
3. UCC § 3-305 provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instru-
ment free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy; to the extent that it is a defense to a simple
contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign
the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity
to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when
he takes the instrument.
The claims and defenses in parts (1) and (2) are known as personal defenses; the
exceptions in (2) (a)-(e) are real defenses. Thus a holder in due course is always subject
to real defenses.
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consumer may have about the defective appliance.4
More often, the consumer will sign a conditional sales con-
tract or a retail installment contract that includes the promis-
sory note. ' The seller will assign the entire contract to a financ-
ing institution. An assignee of a contract is subject to the defen-
ses which the obligor could have asserted against the assignor.,
However, this may be circumvented by including a valid
waiver of defense clause in the contract,7 which insulates the
taker of such a sales contract from the buyer's claims and de-
fenses in much the same way as does the holder in due course
concept.'
The holder in due course doctrine and similar devices
which operate to cut off consumers' claims and defenses
against assignees of credit contracts have been the subject of
considerable controversy in recent years.' These devices impose
4. The doctrine of holder in due course developed in eighteenth century England
as a means of ensuring the negotiability of instruments at a time when communication
was primitive and it was necessary to give protection to remote holders of commercial
paper. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT
IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT]. Today it can be
argued that with instant communication the holder can immediately ascertain
whether the maker has any defenses. Bensen & Squillante, The Role of the Holder in
Due Course Doctrine in Consumer Credit Transactions, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Bensen & Squillantel.
5. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1803.2(a) (West 1973), which states that every
retail installment contract must be contained in a single document, including the
promissory note.
6. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 269, at 419 (1970); UCC
§§ 2-210, 9-318.
7. UCC § 9-206.
8. Id.
9. The literature is voluminous. See, e.g., Bensen & Squillante, supra note 4;
Erickson, Demise of Holder in Due Course, Waiver of Defense, and Interlocking Loan
Lender Defenses in Consumer Transactions, 15 S. TEX. L.J. 236 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Erickson]; Hartman & Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the
Consumer, 77 COM. L.J. 116 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hartman & Walker]; Kripke,
Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Kripkel; Leary, Jr., Timely Demise of Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 117 (1972); Littlefield, Preservation of Consumer Defen-
ses in Interlocking Loans and Credit Card Transactions-Recent Statutes, Policies,
and a Proposal, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 471 [hereinafter cited as Littlefield]; McNeill, The
Necessity of Retaining the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 149 (1972);
Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival or
Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rohner]; Schwartz,
Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer Sales, 15 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 499 (1974); Note, Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights
of a "Holder in Due Course" in Consumer Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
90 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limitations]; Note, The Holder in Due Course
Doctrine in the Aftermath of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 95
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a burden on the consumer who, because of problems stemming
from the sales transaction, stops payments on a retail install-
ment contract. Consequently, the finance company to whom
the merchant assigned the contract initiates suit against the
consumer, demanding payment. If the finance company can
claim HDC status or the existence of a valid waiver of defense
clause, it is shielded from liability for most of the consumer's
grievances. The consumer has no choice but to continue pay-
ments on an unreceived service or an inoperable appliance.
In response to judicial and legislative efforts to restrict the
use of these cutoff devices,' 0 lenders and merchants have devel-
oped another technique to finance consumer transactions and
avoid liability for inadequate services or goods. Instead of nego-
tiating a consumer note or assigning a retail installment con-
tract, the merchant directs the consumer to a finance company
or bank to obtain a loan. This loan, sometimes called an inter-
locking or direct loan, is made "independently" of the sales
transaction. Consequently, the consumer cannot raise against
this "direct" lender the defenses he could have asserted against
the merchant.
In an effort to resolve the consumers' predicament, the
Federal Trade Commission has promulgated a trade regulation
rule preserving consumers' claims and defenses.'' With one
blow, this new rule purports to abolish the holder in due course
doctrine in consumer transactions and to eliminate the prob-
(1975); Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HAtv. L. REv. 1409
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Direct Loan].
10. See text accompanying notes 15-31 infra.
11. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1976). The rule promulgated on November 14, 1975, in 40
Fed. Reg. 53506 (1975) became effective on May 14, 1976. See Appendix A infra for
the complete text of the rule.
The FTC derives its authority to promulgate rules from the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq. (Supp.
1976). This rule designates an unfair or deceptive act or practice falling under § 5 of
the FTC Act: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 15
U.S.C.A. § 45 (Supp. 1976), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). Violations of trade
regulation rules are considered to be violations of the statutory provision upon which
the rule is based. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(d)(3) (Supp. 1976), amending 15 U.S.C. § 41 et
seq. (1970).
A last minute attempt by the National Automobile Dealers Association to defer
the effective promulgation of the rule failed in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana on May 12, 1976. Rep. Waggonner (Dem., 4th Dist., La.)
introduced H.R. 13897 on May 19, 1976, to prohibit the Federal Trade Commission
from promulgating rules that limit the use of holder in due course in consumer transac-
tions. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce. 122 Cong. Rec. 4632 (daily ed. May 19, 1976).
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lems arising out of the interlocking loan. This comment will
discuss the manner in which the FTC attempts to preserve
consumer defenses within the two principal methods of con-
sumer financing. 2
The first of these methods involves the merchant's assign-
ment of a negotiable instrument or consumer credit contract to
a finance company or bank with whom he has some prearrange-
ment or relationship. The FTC rule, by requiring that con-
sumer credit contracts contain a notice to the holder of the
contract that he is subject to all claims and defenses which the
debtor could have asserted against the seller, 3 unconditionally
destroys all shields 4 that an assignee finance company could
establish to circumvent liability for seller misconduct. The
consumer will no longer be obliged to pay on an assigned retail
installment contract for a service he never received.
The second method of consumer financing occurs when the
consumer secures a "direct" loan from a lender who is in some
way connected with the merchant-an "interlocking" lender.
12. As of October, 1975, the aggregate amount of consumer credit in the United
States totaled $190,839,000,000, more than twice the amount in 1965 ($89,883,000,000).
The breakdown of consumer credit in October, 1975, was as follows (in millions of
dollars):
Total installment credit 165,989
automobile paper 52,722
other consumer goods paper 50,584
home improvement loans 8,136
personal loans 45,547
Total noninstallment credit 33,890





Commercial banks held $82,888,000,000 of both installment and noninstallment credit
and finance companies, credit unions, savings and loan associations and retail outlets
held $38,411,000,000 of installment credit. 61 FED. RESERVE BULL. A 45-46 (Dec. 1975).
13. The required FTC notice reads:
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR
SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PRO-
CEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR
SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1976).
14. However, the liability of the holder is limited to the amount paid by the
consumer on the contract. See text accompanying note 171 infra.
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The FTC rule is drafted to reach this method of financing as
well. Unfortunately, the rule defines the necessary relationship
between the seller and the lender in such broad terms as to
include almost all lenders of consumer credit regardless of the
extent of the relationship and the nature of the connection with
the merchant. This may have the effect of exposing the con-
sumer credit industry to a high degree of unpredictable liabil-
ity, resulting in higher credit rates and lower credit availabil-
ity. Such an effect is not necessarily in the best interests of the
consumer.
The financer's ability to assert either HDC status or a
valid waiver of defense clause upon assignment of a consumer
note or contract has already been crippled to a large extent by
judicial and statutory law. On the other hand, only a very few
jurisdictions have attempted to reach the interlocking lender.
The legislation that does exist is derived from the proposals of
the National Commission on Consumer Finance, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the
National Law Center. The FTC approach to the interlocking
loan differs radically from these proposals and recent state leg-
islation.
To evaluate the viability of the FTC rule, this comment
first will review the development of judicial and legislative re-
strictions on the assignment method of financing. Secondly,
important policy considerations involved in exposing the inter-
locking lender to liability will be discussed, focusing upon the
potential effect of the FTC rule on the cost and availability of
consumer credit. It is the premise of this comment that care-
fully drawn proposals which itemize situations that character-
ize the interlocking loan are a more workable solution to the
problem of consumer defenses than the overreaching FTC ap-
proach.
This comment will then consider how the various propos-
als and the FTC rule define the limits of liability of the holder
of the contract, and how this may affect the ultimate cost of
credit to the consumer. Finally, the potential effectiveness of
the FTC rule in light of the recent expansion of FTC enforce-
ment powers will be discussed briefly, with some attention to
the interaction of the new rule with existing state law.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ASSIGNMENTS
Judicial and Legislative Responses
Long before the FTC rule, courts across the country"' had
developed a number of interrelated theories to strip the as-
signee financer of his HDC status. The most widely accepted
theory is known variously as the "co-participant,"' "identity
of parties,"' 7 or "proximity"1" theory, whereby the financer is
found to be so closely connected with the merchant that he
cannot be considered an innocent purchaser of the note or con-
tract."' Factors which trigger a finding of close-connectedness
include the lender's active participation in the transaction
from its inception, an exchange of forms between the merchant
and lender, assignment to the finance company on the day of
sale or soon after, and numerous assignments from the same
seller.2" The financer is deemed to be so close to the seller that
he no longer qualifies as a holder in due course under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, since he is in a position to have actual
or constructive notice and lacks good faith.2' Some courts deny
the financer HDC status on a finding of actual or constructive
notice of the buyer's claims or defenses without further analysis
of the relationship between the merchant and the lender.22 A
15. For an excellent discussion of case law in this area see 3 NATIONAL CONSUMER
LAW CENTER, CONSUMER LAW HANDBOOK, 526-42 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NCLC
HANI)OOKI; articles cited in notes 16-18 infra.
16. Note, Limitations, supra note 9, at 92.
17. Note, Consumer Defenses and Financers as Holders in Due Course, 4 CONN.
L. REV. 83, 95 (1971).
18. Hartman & Walker, supra note 9, at 120.
19. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal.
2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
20. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260(1940); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d
819 (1950); ,Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Mutual Fin.
Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405(1967); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal.
2d 766, 770, 214 P.2d 819, 821 (1950). Courts have also applied the close-connected-
ness doctrine in cases arising under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et
seq. (1970). See, e.g., Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis.
1973); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc.,
347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. II1. 1972); Glaire v. LaLane-Paris Health Spa, Inc., 12 Cal. 3d
915, 528 P.2d 357, 117 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1974). See, Note, The Holder in Due Course
Doctrine in the Aftermath of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 95
(1975).
22. See, e.g., Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1968); Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike Bradford & Co., 177 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Dist.
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few courts have applied an agent-principal theory to closely
connected dealers and lenders;23 others have held the practice
unconscionable. 4 Courts have also found that the use of waiver
of defense clauses is against public policy,25 and that retail
installment contracts cannot be treated like negotiable instru-
ments.2"
It has been observed that the judicial challenges to the
HDC doctrine and waiver of defense clauses lack uniformity
and fail to make any meaningful legal or logical distinctions.27
Moreover, not all jurisdictions are equally willing to protect the
consumer against the unfair results of these practices."
A number of jurisdictions have enacted legislation to deal
with the problem of cutoff devices.29 At least 37 states prohibit
the use of a negotiable instrument, other than a check, in con-
sumer credit transactions, or provide that the use of a promis-
sory note will not cut off consumer defenses.3 Thirty-nine juris-
dictions have either prohibited the use of waiver of defense
clauses or have made the assignee of a consumer credit contract
subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer notwith-
standing any agreement to the contrary.3
Perceiving the need for uniform legislation in this area, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the National Consumer Law Center have proposed model
acts covering all aspects of consumer credit including the pres-
ervation of consumer claims and defenses. The National Con-
Ct. App. 1965); Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d
115 (1963); Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Goetzinger, 245 Iowa 326, 62 N.W.2d 191 (1954); Interna-
tional Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 137 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 1965).
24. See, e.g., Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J.
101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240
N.E.2d 886 (1968).
25. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank v. A.G. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376
(1923); Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); Rehurek
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
26. See, e.g., Geiger Fin. Co. v. Graham, 123 Ga. App. 771,182 S.E.2d 521 (1971).
27. Bensen & Squillante, supra note 4, at 447; Rohner, supra note 9, at 529.
28. See cases cited in Rohner, supra note 9, at 517 n.71.
29. For a descriptive breakdown of state law in this area as of June 1, 1973, see
NCLC HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 575-92.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 583-88. Twelve of these jurisdictions have qualified the restriction on
waiver of defense clauses by requiring a notice of assignment to the consumer and
consumer notice to the assignee within a specified time.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ference drafted the first version of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC) in 1968. Variations of this draft have been
enacted in seven states.2 A number of commentators consid-
ered the 1968 draft ineffective in preserving consumer
defenses; 3 and the 1974 draft of the UCCC represents consider-
able advances in this area. 4 In 1970, the National Consumer
Law Center issued the National Consumer Act (NCA) which
has been called "the militant consumer response" to the 1968
UCCC.: The Center revised the NCA in 1973 and re-named it
the Model Consumer Credit Act (MCCA). Although neither of
the Center's proposals have been adopted in any jurisdiction,
the NCA has had a strong influence on legislation in Massachu-
setts and in Wisconsin.
The FTC Rule
The FTC rule preserving consumers' claims and defenses"
makes it an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a seller,
directly or indirectly, to take a "consumer credit contract"
which does not contain the required notice that any holder of
the contract is subject to consumer claims and defenses.38 A
consumer credit contract is defined in part as any instrument
which evidences or embodies a debt arising from a "financed
sale.""3 "Financing a sale" is "[e]xtending credit to a con-
sumer in connection with a 'Credit Sale' within the meaning
32. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, et seq. (1973); IDAHO CODE tit. 31, et seq. (Supp.
1975); INn. ANN. STAT. tit. 19-22, et seq. (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 16a, etseq. (1974);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, et seq. (Supp. 1975-76); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 70 B, et seq.(Supp. 1975); WYo. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
The 1968 UCCC has also influenced the Truth in Lending Act, Regulation Z and
various state legislation. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 421, § 421.101, et seq. (1974).
33. See, e.g., Littlefield, The Plight of the Consumer in the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, 48 DENVER L.J. 1 (1971); Miller & Warren, A Report on the Revision of
the UCCC, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1974); Spanogle, Jr., The U3C-It May Look Pretty,
But Is It Enforceable?, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 624 (1968).
34. A California version of the 1974 UCCC, S.B. 1019, died in committee this
year.
35. Note, Direct Loan, supra note 9, at 1436.
36. Id.; NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AcT iv
(1973).
37. To understand the operation of the FTC rule one must look to the definitions
for an explanation of each clause. To understand one definition, it is often necessary
to refer to another definition. See Appendix A infra for the complete text of the rule.
38. The rule is drafted so that only the seller, not the creditor, can be in violation
of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The FTC is proposing an amendment to
the rule that will also cover creditors. 40 Fed. Reg. 53530 (1975). See text accompany-
ing notes 46-48 infra.
39. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(i) (1976). See Appendix A infra.
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of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z" 4°-that is, "any
sale with respect to which credit is extended or arranged by the
seller," including a lease.4 This covers seller-arranged retail
installment contracts, either open-end or other than open-
end,42 but does not cover bank-issued (three-party) credit
cards.43 Thus, a seller who simultaneously arranges credit and
negotiates a consumer credit contract which does not contain
the requisite notice violates section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.4
The FTC notice in the contract, addressed to "any
holder," applies to all subsequent assignees of the contract and
thereby preserves all claims and defenses which the debtor (the
consumer) could assert against the seller.45 Although the Fed-
eral Trade Commission expects that all creditors will include
this notice in all of their consumer credit contracts, the
rule-primarily because the FTC has no jurisdiction over
banks4"-does not make it an unfair or deceptive act or practice
for financers to omit the notice. To correct this inequity, the
FTC is proposing an amendment which would apply the rule
40. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(e) (1976).
41. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1970).
42. Open-end credit refers to a plan whereby the creditor allows the consumer
to make purchases or obtain loans from time to time; where the consumer may pay
the balance either in full or in installments; and where a finance charge is computed
from time to time on an outstanding balance. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(x) (1976); 15 U.S.C. §
1602(i) (1970).
43. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(c), (h) (1976).
Banks are the creditors in three-party credit card transactions and since the FTC
does not have jurisdiction to regulate banks, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(6) (Supp. 1976), it
could not include three-party credit cards within the rule. A three-party credit card is
closely analogous to a direct loan and it is equally desirable to preserve consumer
claims and defenses against the credit card issuer. See Brandel & Leonard, Bank
Charge Cards: New Cash or Credit, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1971); Note, Development
of Consumer Defenses Under a Tripartite Credit Card System, 24 SYRAcusE L. REV.
1279 (1973); Note, Preserving Consumer Defenses in Credit Card Transactions, 81
YALE L.J. 287 (1971).
The Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666, et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974), preserves
consumer claims and defenses in three-party credit card transactions if three condi-
tions are met: (1) a good faith attempt by the debtor to obtain satisfactory resolution
from the merchant honoring the credit card; (2) the amount of the initial transaction
exceeds $50; and (3) the place where the initial transaction occurred was in the same
state or within 100 miles of the mailing address of the cardholder. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i
(Supp. IV, 1974).
See also California legislation which is similar to the Fair Credit Billing Act: CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1747.90 (West 1973).
44. See note 11 supra.
45. See note 13 supra and Appendix A infra.
46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(6) (Supp. 1976).
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to creditors."7 Banks will be covered if the Federal Reserve
Board adopts a similar provision pursuant to the Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1975.11
Aside from limits on liability," the rule places no qualifica-
tions on the rights of the consumer. For example, the financer's
notice of assignment to the consumer does not cut off subse-
quent defenses, nor is the debtor required to notify the assignee
within a specified period in order to preserve his rights.5 0 Such
time-notice provisions in existing state statutes have been criti-
cized as being unfair to consumers whose claims arise after the
cutoff point."
The rationale for an unqualified preservation of defenses
where the seller arranges for or extends credit is clear. When a
seller offers to assign a contract to a financer, the latter has
every opportunity to learn where the proceeds of the credit
contract were applied and the business practices of the seller.
A financer who has not had previous dealings with the seller
47. 40 Fed. Reg. 53530 (1975).
48. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2196-97. This Act mandates
that the Federal Reserve Board issue regulations similar to any rule promulgated under
the procedures outlined within the 1975 Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57(f) (Supp. 1976). The
rule preserving consumer claims and defenses promulgated before the effective date
of the 1975 Act is not subject to this provision. However, the Act does apply to the
proposed amendment extending the coverage to creditors. 40 Fed. Reg. 53530 (1975).
Thus, when and if the rule becomes applicable to creditors and the Federal Reserve
Board issues a similar regulation, banks would be subject to penalties for taking a
consumer credit contract that does not contain the notice preserving consumers' claims
and defenses.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has proposed a similar
regulation pursuant to the 1975 Act. It is currently receiving comments to consider
whether or not to promulgate the rule. The Federal Reserve Board is not required to
adopt a similar regulation if it finds that such acts or practices of banks are not unfair
or deceptive or that implementation of similar regulations would seriously conflict with
essential monetary and payments systems of the Board. 41 Fed. Reg. 7110-11 (1976).
As to the rule currently in effect, the Comptroller of the Currency has issued a
release to the presidents of all national banks notifying them that the failure of banks
to include the requisite notice in certain direct loan agreements will preclude sellers
from accepting the proceeds of the loan. This release also warns banks that bank
acquisition of seller contracts containing the FTC notice may subject these banks to
potential claims and defenses which the consumer could assert against the seller.
Banks are advised to review current dealings in consumer paper to ascertain the likeli-
hood of potential liabilities and the conformance of all paper issued after May 14, 1976,
to the requirements of the rule. 5 C.C.H. CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE, 98,426.
49. See note 14 supra and text accompanying note 170 infra.
50. See note 31 supra.
51. See, e.g., NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 35; Warren, Comments on Vasquez
v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1041, 1068-70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as War-
renl. See also the 1968 UCCC § 2.404 Alternative A and Alternative B; for commenta-
tors' criticisms of these provisions, see note 33 supra.
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can readily check the merchant's reputation for reliability,"2
and if it is questionable, he can refuse the contract, set up a
reserve account for bad debts with the seller, or require the
seller to guarantee the loan. Costs thus incurred are passed on
to the seller and then to the consumer in the price of the goods
or services. 3 As the National Conference on Consumer Finance
(NCCF) has observed, "[Sipreading the costs of abolishing
third party cutoff devices to all consumers in the marketplace
would be more than counter-balanced by the protections which




Current state provisions and the various model acts pre-
serve consumer claims and defenses only in situations where
the seller makes a direct assignment of the contract to the
financer. After these statutes were enacted, lenders learned
that they could still avoid liability for purchasers' claims and
defenses through the use of an interlocking loan arrangement."5
In an interlocking loan-known also as a vendor-related loan,
direct loan, and colloquially as "dragging the body'" 5 -the
seller does not assign any note or contract, but refers his cus-
tomer to an "independent" lender. This lender advances a loan
to the consumer, enabling him to buy the particular good or
service which the merchant is promoting. 7 This is essentially
a direct cash loan, and the lender is neither an assignee nor an
HDC. Until recently, there was no legal theory which would
attribute liability to this lender for any claims or defenses aris-
ing out of the consumer transaction; since the lender was not
directly involved in the sales transaction, he could claim com-
plete immunity from consumer defenses.
52. See note 62 infra.
53. See notes 58-63 and accompanying text infra.
54. NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 37.
55. See Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the
New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 272 (1969).
56. Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Basis and Purpose on Trade Regu-
lation Rule on the Preservation of Consumers'Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53514
(1975) [hereinafter cited as FTC Statementl.
57. The interlocking loan is frequently used to obtain downpayments for the
purchase of automobiles-in this context it is often referred to as a "side loan."
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Allocation of Costs and Policing the Marketplace
Drafters of legislation dealing with reform in consumer
credit must consider the effect a particular method will have
on the allocation of costs among the lender, the merchant, and
the consumer. The adequacy of such legislation as a tool for
policing the marketplace is also an important consideration."
A rule preserving consumer claims and defenses operates
to shift the risk of seller misconduct from the individual con-
sumer to the financer. The financer allocates the costs of this
risk among consumers in the form of higher credit rates, and/or
shifts the cost back to the seller by means of recourse or repur-
chase arrangements." But despite the availability of protective
maneuvers, financers made subject to consumer defenses are
less likely to deal with sellers who have a history of misconduct.
This has the effect, eventually, of eliminating disreputable
merchants from the market.'"
The proponents of such legislation contend that it is in the
interest of public policy to impose the risks upon the finance
company." The individual consumer has little bargaining
power with the merchant and does not have the resources to
maintain an action against a seller who may be insolvent or
unavailable. Financers, on the other hand, with their access to
information, their risk-shifting mechanisms"2 and their ability
to put pressure on the less reputable merchants, are in a better
position than are consumers to police the market and bear the
costs of seller misconduct. 3
58. NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 36-37; FTC Statement, supra note 56, at
53522-23; Littlefield, supra note 9, at 494; Rohner, supra note 9, at 538-44; Note, Direct
Loan. supra note 9, at 1411-15.
59. In recourse or repurchase agreements the seller repurchases from the financer
all goods the financer has repossessed due to the consumer's default. In this way the
seller assumes liability for that default. R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMER-
CIAl. AND CONSUMER LAW 220 (2d ed. 1974).
60. See note 58 supra.
61. See, e.g., NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 36-37; FTC Statement, supra note
56, at 53523; Kripke, supra note 9, at 472.
62. See R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW
213-42 (2d ed. 1974) where various financing patterns are described. These mechanisms
include the financing of inventory (floor planning) wherein the creditor takes a security
interest in the inventory as well as in the proceeds. The proceeds include "chattel
paper" which may be a retail installment contract and a note. As part of the financing
agreement the debtor may assign all the consumer chattel paper to the creditor as the
security interest which the creditor has in the proceeds. The creditor will take ordinary
precautions to protect his security interest such as a routine check of the debtor's
records. See note 101 infra.
63. See Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953); Unico v. Owen,
50 N.A. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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Maintaining reserve accounts for bad debts, transacting
and following up recourse arrangements and policing mer-
chants add to the cost of the financers' operations. This cost is
ultimately turned back to the consumer in the form of higher
credit rates and/or a reduction in the availability of credit. 4
Consequently, the central issue in reforming the interlocking
loan situation is to determine how high the cost of reform
should be. It is recognized that where a lender and merchant
are "closely connected," the cost to the lender (and ultimately
to the consumer) of protecting against seller misconduct is rela-
tively small. However, the fewer the transactions between a
lender and a particular merchant, the more tenuous and spo-
radic the relationship, the higher the cost of protecting against
seller misconduct. 5 In order to achieve an equitable distribu-
tion of risks and an effective policing of the market, therefore,
the type of lender-merchant relationship that justifies strip-
ping the financer of his traditional shield must be carefully
defined.
One proposal suggests that a financer who knows that the
proceeds of the loan will be used in a particular consumer
transaction should be subject to consumer claims and defenses
regardless of the closeness or remoteness of his relationship
with the retailer." This commentator recognizes that the cost
to the financers of repurchase agreements and other expedients
designed to discourage seller misconduct will vary with the
degree of interrelatedness of seller and financer. At the point
where the costs of further policing exceed the gains, the lender
would absorb the losses from bad debts as a cost of doing busi-
ness. This cost would in turn be reflected in higher credit rates.
64. The National Commission on Consumer Finance ran a cross state econo-
metric study which indicated that in those states which have prohibited both holder
in due course status and waiver of defense clauses there has been an observable reduc-
tion in the purchase of consumer chattel paper by finance companies and a reduction
in the availability of total consumer credit. NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
A survey was conducted in Connecticut to evaluate the effect of legislation which
eliminated negotiability of notes in home solicitation sales. The students found a
marked reduction in the financing of businesses engaged in door-to-door sales. Note,
A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability
and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YAi.E L.J. 618 (1969).
There is no reliable empirical data reflecting the actual effect on cost and availa-
bility of credit from any of the jurisdictions which have severely restricted HDC status
for interlocking lenders, and thus at present there is no way to evaluate accurately the
economic impact of such legislation.
65. Note, Direct Loan, supra note 9, at 1418, 1421-22.
66. Id. at 1413, 1417, 1421-23, 1437.
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The writer admits, however, that this is only possible if "un-
realistic" credit rate ceilings are removed. 7 The rationale here
is that the cost to a consumer of a given product must approxi-
mate the "real social cost" of providing that product. 8
Another proposal is to preserve consumer defenses only
against those interlocking lenders who either have recourse
rights against the seller or are so closely connected with the
seller that recourse rights are easily arranged. In this way the
major cost of seller misconduct is passed back to the seller, a
procedure which has the effect of either raising the price of the
seller's product or discouraging future misconduct. The finan-
cer has only the costs of establishing recourse arrangements,
maintaining reserve accounts and policing the merchants with
whom he deals. When these costs are allocated among all the
consumer transactions this lender is involved in, the cost to the
consumer in the form of increased rates should be minimal.
Thus, a proposal which limits "interlocking lender" liability to
the situation where the lender is in a position to make recourse
arrangements with the merchant is more consistent with the
policies of equitable risk allocation and effective market polic-
ing.71)
The increasing use of the interlocking loan to circumvent
restrictions on consumer cutoff devices has provoked a number
of commentators,7' including the National Commission on
Consumer Finance, 7 to look for means of closing this loophole.
Consequently, the 1974 UCCC,73 the NCA,74 and the MCCA71
have outlined criteria for determining when a lender is to be
considered an "interlocking" lender subject to consumer
claims. These model guidelines incorporate essentially the
same factors which the courts considered important in defining
a closely connected assignee financer. Accordingly, the same
67. Id. at 1417.
68. Id. at 1415.
69. Rohner, supra note 9, at 545-47.
70. Id. at 547.
71. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 9; Littlefield, supra note 9; Miller, AnAlterna-
tiue Response to the Supposed Direct Loan Loophole in the UCCC, 24 OKLA. L. REV.
427 (1971); Warren, supra note 51, at 1090-91; Note, Direct Loan, supra note 9.
72. NCCF REI'owr, supra note 4, at 35-38.
73. 1974 UCCC § 3.405. See Appendix B infra for text.
74. NATIONAL, CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAl. CONSUMER AcT § 2.407 (1970)
Ihereinafter cited as NCAI. See Appendix E infra for text.
75. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 2.603
(197:3) Ihereinafter cited as MCCAJ. See Appendix F infra for text.
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logic used in reaching the conclusion that the assignee is not a
holder in due course, it is urged, should be applied to the inter-
locking lender: if he is closely connected to the merchant and
actively involved in the sales transaction, he should be treated
as a party to the sale and subject to the same claims and
defenses that the consumer would have against the original
seller. A handful of states have enacted interlocking loan legis-
lation." The 1976 FTC trade regulation rule also covers the
interlocking loan situation," but includes a broader spectrum
of creditors than do any of the other proposals or statutes.
The validity of any attempt to preserve consumer defenses
in interlocking loans must be weighed against the cost of thereform since all such costs ultimately fall upon the consumer."
The following sections of this comment will examine how these
proposals attempt to preserve consumer defenses and, at the
same time, keep the cost of reform to a minimum.
Proposed Legislation
The National Conference on Consumer Finance (NCCF)
has observed that it is a difficult task to draft legislation in the
interlocking loan area that does not also inhibit independent
lending.79 The NCCF suggestions and the lists of criteria defin-
ing "close connectedness" in the National Consumer Act
(NCA), 9 the Model Consumer Credit Act (MCCA),1' the 1974
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), 2 the 1973 FTC pro-
posed rule, 3 and state statutes, 4 are all attempts to pinpoint
those situations in which the seller and lender cooperate to
circumvent legislation that otherwise would remove the protec-
tion of HDC status and waiver of defense clauses. Since the
state provisions embody bits and pieces of all the assorted pro-
posals, this comment will focus its analysis upon the NCCF
76. See note 117 infra.
77. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1976).
78. NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 37; Littlefield, supra note 9, at 494-95; Roh-
ner, supra note 9, at 535-37; Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE
L.J. 481 (1973); Note, Direct Loan, supra note 9, at 1411-12, 1415.
79. NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 35.
80. NCA § 2.407.
81. MCCA § 2.603.
82. 1974 UCCC § 3.405.
83. 38 Fed. Reg. 893 (1973) Ihereinafter cited as 1973 FTC Rule § 433]. This
was the second proposed version of the FTC rule to preserve consumers' claims and
defenses. See note 118 infra.
84. See note 117 infra.
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suggestions, the NCA, the MCCA, the 1974 UCCC, and the
1973 FTC rule.
Each of these proposals represents a slightly different ap-
proach to the problem of defining the interlocking lender. The
NCA suggests seven factors, any one of which involves suffi-
cient participation in or connectedness with a consumer sale or
lease transaction to establish interlocking lender status. 5 Such
a creditor is subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer
arising from the sale or lease for which the proceeds of the loan
were used. 6 The NCCF proposes six such criteria. 7 The MCCA
list contains eleven factors, all of which are rebuttable by a
showing that the lender acted in good faith and without knowl-
edge that the proceeds of the loan were to be used in a con-
sumer transaction. The 1973 FTC rule defines a "related"
creditor as one who meets any one of nine rebuttable criteria,8"
with no indication how the creditor can rebut the presump-
tions. The 1974 UCCC lists six factors,"° but provides that a
consumer must make a good faith attempt to obtain satisfac-
tion from the merchant before proceeding against the lender."1
There are a number of elements common to all these pro-
posed definitions. One is that the creditor be "related to" the
seller. 2 The NCCF and the 1973 FTC rule define "related to"
as encompassing any familial relationship. 3 These two propos-
als also define an interlocking lender as one who is directly or
indirectly controlled by or under the common control of the
seller, or otherwise affiliated with the seller. 4 The 1974 UCCC
qualifies the "related to" criterion by eliminating those rela-
tionships which are so remote as to be unlikely to affect the
consumer transaction." Clearly, a relationship, whether fami-
lial or organizational, implies the lender's awareness of the
seller's activities and ability to arrange for guarantees;" there
85. NCA § 2 .407(2)(a)-(g). See Appendix E infra.
86. NCA § 2.407(1).
87. NCCF REPORT, supra note 4 at 37-38. See Appendix C infra.
88. MCCA § 2.603. See Appendix F infra.
89. 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(1)-(9), supra note 83. See Appendix D infra.
90. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(1)(a)-(f). See Appendix B infra.
91. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(2).
92. Id. § 2.405(1)(b); 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(1), supra note 83; MCCA §2
.
6 0 3 (4)(a); NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 37; NCA § 2.407(2)(a).
93. NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 37; 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(1), supra note
83.
94. 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(4)-(5), supra note 83; NCCF REPORT, supra note
4, at 37.
95. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(1)(b).
96. See Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Rehurek
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is no problem reconciling a related merchant and creditor with
the policy considerations of risk allocation and policing the
marketplace.
Neither the NCA nor the MCCA, however, make any at-
tempt to define what is meant by "relatedness," and their
definitions of an interlocking lender could include very remote
relationships that have no bearing upon the ability of the
lender to absorb the costs or to investigate the merchant.
Another common feature of an interlocking loan situation
is that the forms used by the consumer in securing the loan are
either supplied or prepared for the seller by the lender, or con-
versely, supplied or prepared for the lender by the seller."
There is perhaps no more convincing evidence of an interlock-
ing loan than such an exchange of forms." The exchange is
prima facie evidence of an arrangement between the financer
and the merchant, indicating that the financer can also arrange
for some recourse against the seller.
A third common factor is payment of consideration, di-
rectly or indirectly, by the lender to the seller for arranging the
loan or for referring consumers to the lender.9 The NCA does
not require that the consideration be in connection with any
particular transaction. 0° As with the exchange of forms, the
lender's payment of some sort of fee or commission to the seller
is clear evidence of a mutual agreement and is indicative of the
lender's opportunity to inform himself of the seller's activi-
ties. 101
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Unico v. Owen,
50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). In these cases the seller and financer were organiza-
tionally related. This factor influenced the courts in determining that the financer took
the assigned consumer contract without the good faith requisite for holder in due
course status.
97. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(1)(d); 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(2)-(3), supra note 83;
MCCA § 2.603(4)(b); NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 37; NCA § 2.407(2)(b)-(c).
98. See Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Rehurek v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101,
232 A.2d 405 (1967). In these cases the exchange of forms between the assignee-financer
and seller was strong indication to the courts of close connectedness.
99. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(1)(a); 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(6), supra note 83;
MCCA § 2.603(4)(d); NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
100. NCA § 2.407(2)(f).
101. See Associates Discount Corp. v. Goetzinger, 245 Iowa 326, 62 N.W.2d 191
(1954). Here part of the arrangement between seller and financer included a commis-
sion for all consumer paper acquired by the creditor. The facts in this case provide a
good example of "floor planning." The creditor financed the automobile merchant's
inventory and acquired all consumer paper. The commissions were held in a reserve
account until the buyer completed payments.
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With the exception of the 1974 UCCC, all the proposals
provide that a seller's referral of a consumer to a creditor sug-
gests an interlocking loan. The NCA proposes that an unquali-
fied seller referral be regarded as sufficient indication of close
interrelatedness. °10 The other proposals require more: the
MCCA looks for a referral agreement between the seller and
lender;'"3 the 1973 FTC rule proposes that referrals followed by
at least five loans in one year in which the proceeds are used
in transactions with the same seller be deemed evidence of
interlocking situations. '04 The NCCF looks for referrals con-
nected with repeated and regular loans used with the same
seller. '"I
The drafters of these statutory schemes acknowledge that
seller referral to a particular lender, in the absence of other
evidence indicating a relationship between them, should not
subject the lender to consumer claims and defenses. This is
consistent with the policies of equitable risk allocation and
effective market policing. Mere seller referral to a lender does
not necessarily imply that the lender is even aware of the
seller's existence, '01 and the seller may suggest a credit source
to a consumer without expecting any specific advantage. It
would be unwise to impose the costs of seller misconduct upon
a lender who was not in any realistic sense involved in the
particular consumer transaction. To do so would increase the
costs of protecting against liabilities beyond the point where it
would benefit the consumer. A lender, faced with referrals from
an unknown seller with whom he has no recourse arrangements
or other guarantees, may become reluctant to provide con-
sumer loans. The 1974 UCCC wisely eliminates mere seller
referral as evidence of an interlocking loan.
Three of the proposals consider any recourse arrangement
or seller guarantee of the loan indicative of an interlocking
situation. °7 This factor is clearly the most consistent with risk
allocation policies, since the lender is able to shift the cost of
seller misconduct back to the seller.' 8 Such cost may be re-
102. NCA § 2.40 7(2)(e).
103. MCCA § 2.603(4)(h), (i).
104. 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(8), supra note 83.
105. NCCF REPOHIT, supra note 4, at 38.
106. See text accompanying notes 137-45 infra.
107. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(1)(c); 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(7), supra note 83;
MCCA § 2.60 3(4)(c).
108. Rohner, supra note 9, at 545-47; Note, Direct Loan, supra note 9, at 1414-
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flected in the cash price of the seller's goods or services as a
normal cost of doing business, but since the lender does not
bear the cost, it will not be reflected in the price of credit-an
advantage to the credit buyer. When the increased cost is ab-
sorbed by the price of the product, it is ultimately borne by all
consumers, whether or not they buy on credit. The cost of
credit, therefore, need not be raised beyond the reach of those
consumers who rely on it. Any "unfairness" of this result is
mitigated, however, by the fact that recourse agreements put
a severe financial squeeze on sellers who acquire a reputation
for not meeting the contract, since consumers cannot readily
obtain credit funds to purchase their products or services. The
premise here is that a slightly more expensive, yet reliable,
product is more desirable than one that is lower priced, not as
reliable, yet costs more to those who buy on credit.
Knowledge of consumer complaints about a particular
seller's misconduct before a consumer loan is made is sufficient
for interlocking lender status in three of the proposals, '"0 pro-
vided the creditor knows how and where the proceeds of the
loan are to be spent."0 This criterion is clearly consistent with
the policy of eliminating disreputable merchants from the mar-
ketplace.' Subjecting a creditor with such knowledge to con-
sumer defenses is in a sense a penalty for encouraging a dishon-
est merchant to remain in business.
A loan conditioned upon the consumer's purchase of goods
or services from a particular seller is an interlocking one under
the MCCA and the 1974 UCCC proposals."' This is clear indi-
cation of lender knowledge and it may be presumed that a
lender would not so condition a loan unless he could be assured
of payment unobstructed by valid consumer claims. Thus, this
factor is also consistent with the policy of pressuring the disre-
putable merchant.
The MCCA proposes consideration of some additional fac-
tors, including the lender's payment of the proceeds of the loan
109. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(1)(f); 1973 FTC Rule § 433.1(h)(9)(ii), supra note 83;
NCCF REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
110. See, e.g., Beatty v. Franklin Inv. Co., 319 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (financer
had constructive knowledge of seller's usurious rates); Financial Credit Corp. v. Wil-
liams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967) (financer deemed to have constructive notice
of seller's activities through newspaper articles); Walker v. Commercial Credit Co., 107
S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (financer knew that repossessed car was not new as
represented by seller).
111. Rohner, supra note 9, at 542-43.
112. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(1)(e); MCCA § 2.603(4)(f).
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to the seller, either individually or jointly with the consumer."'
In such a situation the lender clearly has knowledge of how the
proceeds are to be used, but this does not necessarily indicate
a previous agreement with the merchant. Nevertheless, if the
lender knows who the seller is, he can inform himself about the
seller's activities. The cost of such policing will vary with the
remoteness of his contact with the merchant." 4 The MCCA also
considers the taking of a security interest in the property which
is the subject of the loan to indicate an interlocking lender." '
As one commentator has noted, this would include those lend-
ers who take a valid security interest in the debtor's consumer
goods without specifically claiming those goods purchased with
the proceeds of the loan.'"' Since the taking of a security inter-
est does not necessarily indicate knowledge of the particular
seller, it would be difficult for the lender to protect himself
against liability for consumer claims. This result is not consis-
tent with either risk allocation or policing considerations.
These five proposals outline specific factors and courses of
dealing which, used as indicia of the interlocking loan, gener-
ally accord with the policies of risk allocation and policing."7
The proposals list those practices which indicate an ongoing
relationship between seller and financer or which suggest op-
113. MCCA § 2.603(4)(e).
114. Note, Direct Loan, supra note 9, at 1422.
115. MCCA § 2.603(4)(j).
116. Rohner, supra note 9, at 546.
117. Seven jurisdictions have enacted legislation dealing with the interlocking
loan. Arizona requires the loan to have been "arranged" by.the seller: "arranged"
means the seller received a commission or has knowledge of the terms of the loan and
part icipates in the preparation of the forms. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 44-145C (Supp.
1975-76). The District of Columbia statute, D.C. CODE § 28-3809(a) (Supp. 1976-77),
specifies that the creditor be under the same control as the seller, or pay the seller for
referral, or that the seller prepare the documents. Kansas law, KAN. STAT. ANN. ch.
16a-3-405 (Supp. 1975), describes circumstances including the seller's guarantee of the
loan or preparation of the forms, the creditor's furnishing of the forms, or a conditioned
loan. Maryland's provision, Mn. CODE. ANN. tits. 12-207, 12-309 (1975), is patterned
after the MCCA but does not include some of that Act's all-encompassing sections.
The Massachusetts statute, MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 255, § 12F (Supp. 1976), is patterned
after the NCA, omitting the situation where the lender rewards the seller for a loan.
Only two, rather than the NCA twenty, connected transactions in one year are suffi-
cient proof of an interlocking lender. New York's statute, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 252-
54 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76), has a rebuttable list including knowing participation
in or direct connection with the sale, and family or formal business relationship, or
an exchange of forms. In Wisconsin, an interlocking consumer loan is defined by one
of five rebuttable conditions similar to NCA § 2.407(2)(a), (c), (f) and MCCA § 2.603(4)(c), (g), as well as knowledge of the seller's bad reputation. Wis. STAT. ANN. ch.
422.408(3) (1974).
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portunities for the prudent, reputable financer to protect
against unusual losses. The definitions of the interlocking
lender are, on the whole, limited to a lender who is in a position
to investigate the seller's business activities, and, if necessary,
to shift the major costs back to the seller.
The FTC Rule
The approach of the FTC to the interlocking loan differs
from that of the model acts."' The rule contains no rebuttable
presumptions, nor does it itemize factors which could serve as
useful guidelines to courts or the business community in deter-
mining when there has been a violation. Rather, the descrip-
tion of an interlocking loan must be found by piecing together
the FTC definitions of "purchase money loan,""' 9 "contract,"''"
and "business arrangement."'' The generalizations contained
in these definitions suggest the same situations outlined by the
National Conference of Consumer Finance (NCCF), the Na-
tional Consumer Law Center (NCA and MCCA), and the 1974
UCCC, 2 but in addition encompass a good deal more. The
FTC claims that its version of the rule achieves greater clarity
and uniformity and allows for more flexibility.' There may
indeed be flexibility, but a more inartful rule could not have
been drafted. 2 '
The critical question is whether a rule preserving con-
sumer claims and defenses should expose to liability every
lender who has informal connections with sellers of consumer
goods and services, or whether such a rule should be limited
only to those lenders who have a reasonable opportunity to
protect themselves against the costs of seller misconduct. To
evaluate the consistency of the FTC rule with the policies of
risk allocation and policing the market, we will examine the
118. The original FTC rule on the preservation of consumers' claims and defenses
proposed in 1971 covered only the assignment of retail installment contracts; it did not
deal at all with the interlocking loan. 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971). The rule proposed in
1973 was revised completely to include vendor-related loans and credit cards. See notes
43, 83 supra.
119. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1976). See Appendix A infra.
120. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(f) (1976).
121. Id. § 433.1(g).
122. See text accompanying notes 79-116 supra.
123. FTC Statement, supra note 56, at 53525.
124. The staff of the Federal Trade Commission has issued Guidelines on the
Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses,
41 Fed. Reg. 20022, May 14, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Guidelines], to help explain
some of the ambiguities inherent in the rule.
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rule closely to determine exactly which lenders may come
under its wide umbrella.
The rule defines a consumer credit contract as "any instru-
ment which evidences or embodies a debt arising from a 'Pur-
chase Money Loan' transaction."'' 5 The definition of a pur-
chase money loan reflects the major ambiguities and deficien-
cies of the rule. The first portion of this definition states that
a purchase money loan is a
cash advance which is received by a consumer in return for
a "Finance Charge" within the meaning of the Truth in
Lending Act and Regulation Z, which is applied, in whole
or substantial part, to a purchase of goods or services from
a seller .... 26
Under Regulation Z, a finance charge includes charges imposed
by the creditor in connection with a checking account when
these charges are related to an extension of credit.' 7
Although the FTC cannot proscribe unfair or deceptive
practices by banks,'28 this rule affects the sources of all types
of credit, including bank-derived credit. Thus, a purchase
money loan may include a cash advance obtained by the con-
sumer through a personal signature loan,' 9 his bank overdraft
privileges, or the use of a guaranteed check card.3 0 It is also
arguable that the "cash advance" definition covers bank loan
checks, a service offered along with many bank-issued credit
card programs.' 3 Even though the rule explicitly exempts from
coverage any creditor acting in the capacity of a credit card
issuer, it is not clear if the rule also excludes that same creditor
125. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(i) (1976).
126. Id. § 433.1(d).
127. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 n.2 (1975).
128. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
129. Comments of the Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal ReserveSystem on the Federal Trade Commission Rule Entitled "Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses," 16 C.F.R. § 433, May 5, 1976, at 5-6 [hereinafter cited as FRB
Comments] (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.).
130. Letter from Roland E. Brandel, Morrison and Foerster, Legal Counsel toWestern States Bankcard Association, to the Office of the Secretary, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, March 30, 1976, at 5-6 [hereinafter cited asW.S.B.A. Letter] (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.); FRB Comments, supra note 129,
at 12-13. See also Letter from Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System, to Calvin J. Collier, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, May 5, 1976 (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.). This letter was sent to the F'rC as
a last minute attempt to dissuade the Commission from promulgating the rule.
131. W.S.B.A. Letter, supra note 130, at 4-5.
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when he provides loan services collateral to the credit card
plan. 13 2
Cash advances of this type are made by the bank without
any knowledge of how or where the cash is to be spent. 11 3 Fur-
thermore, under the rule, the consumer's personal check be-
comes a consumer credit contract when used to take advantage
of an overdraft privilege or check guarantee. It is absurd to
expect the bank to print the FTC notice on these checks to
avoid imposing the potential risk of violating the FTC Act upon
a merchant. 1
34
Incorporating these cash advances within the definition of
a purchase money loan creates other insoluble problems. The
FTC does not define how substantial a part of the cash advance
must be used for a consumer purchase to bring it within the
rule. 135 For example, will the bank be liable for the total pur-
chase price of the consumer good or service, or will liability be
limited to the portion of the overdraft applied to the purchase?
The FTC Guidelines note that application of the rule will
not be triggered in most overdraft account situations. The ra-
tionale is that the extension of credit is completed at the time
the overdraft privilege is approved, not at the time the monies
are applied to a specific purchase.3 6 However, the rule itself is
not explicitly restricted to the initial extension of credit; it
refers to a cash advance applied in whole or substantial part
to a particular purchase.
To fall within the rule, a cash advance received must be
used for "a purchase of goods or services from a seller who (1)
refers consumers to the creditor. . .. "'7 Thus, the rule makes
it an unfair or deceptive act for a seller to receive the proceeds
of this loan if he also refers consumers to the issuer of that loan.
There appears to be no requirement other than that the seller
refer at least two consumers to the creditor. It is not necessary
that the seller have referred the particular consumer involved
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id. at 3; FRB Comments, supra note 129, at 4-5, 13.
134. Compare legislation preserving consumer claims and defenses when negoti-
able instruments are used: in such legislation checks are explicitly excluded from
coverage. See text accompanying note 30 supra; FRB Comments, supra note 129, at
13.
135. W.S.B.A. Letter, supra note 130, at 6-7; FRB Comments, supra note 129,
at 22.
136. Guidelines, supra note 124, at 20026.
137. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1976). See Appendix A infra for the complete text of
this definition.
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in the transaction at issue. In the Statement of Basis and Pur-
pose for this rule, the FTC notes, "[W]e are persuaded that
. ..the act of referral is sufficient to justify imposition of the
rule, provided referrals are made in the course of some routine
or arrangement . . . ."I" However, by separating the "refer-
ral" clause, (1), from the "affiliation" clause, (2), in the re-
mainder of the purchase money loan definition with the word
"or," the FTC neglected to require that seller referrals, like
affiliations, involve "some routine or arrangement." Two con-
sumer referrals by a seller without any other criteria do not
necessarily suggest an interlocking loan.'39 It is difficult, if not
impossible, for a totally unrelated creditor to ascertain that a
particular merchant is referring consumers to him. 4 ' In fact, a
disreputable merchant unable to obtain commercial purchas-
ers for his chattel paper because of his poor reputation will very
probably suggest other sources of credit to potential buyers,
without the creditor's complicity or sanction.'' Rather than
take the risk that a consumer has been referred to him by a
disreputable merchant, independent lenders will be reluctant
to extend loans unless they can impose limitations on where the
proceeds are to be spent.'
The Staff Guidelines help to clarify what is intended by
"refers consumers to the creditor." Apparently, when the seller
suggests that there are loan companies in the area, or provides
consumers with a list of local finance companies, this is not a
referral but merely "information."'' "In short, where there is
no communication whatsoever between a seller and a lender,
there is no referral unless the seller is actively steering his
138. FTC Statement, supra note 56, at 53525 (emphasis added).
139. See text accompanying note 106 supra. See also Comments on behalf of theNew York State Bankers Association to the Office of the Secretary, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, January 14, 1976, at 7 [hereinafter cited as N.Y.S.B.A.
Comments (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.); Letter from Sharyn G. Campbell, Coun-
sel to the Credit Union National Association, to Christopher W. Keller, Presiding
Officer, Federal Trade Commission, March 5, 1976, at 6 [hereinafter cited as C.U.N.A.
Letterl (on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.).
140. FRB Comments, supra note 129, at 7.
141. N.Y.S.B.A. Comments, supra note 139, at 7.
142. FRB Comments, supra note 129, at 6.
It has been observed that the FTC rule, ironically, could create some antitrustproblems. In order to protect itself from unpredictable liability a finance company may
establish a list of disreputable merchants. Credit would be advanced only on the
condition that the consumer not buy from any of these merchants. This is possibly a
restraint of trade and a potential exposure to trade defamation actions. C.U.N.A.
Letter, supra note 139, at 13-14.
143. Guidelines, supra note 124, at 20025.
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customers to a predesignated loan outfit for credit."'44 This
distinction is not implicit in the rule itself. The Guidelines are
not intended to alter or amend the rule,"'4 yet this is exactly the
effect of the Commission explanation of the referral clause. It
is hoped that courts will be persuaded by the Guidelines, or
preferably, that the FTC will amend this clause so that it ade-
quately reflects what appears to be the intended meaning. Per-
haps the following language would be acceptable: "routinely
refers consumers to the creditor" or "engages in the practice of
referring consumers to the creditor."
A purchase money loan-that is, a loan which subjects the
lender to consumer claims and defenses-is alternatively de-
fined as a cash advance used to purchase goods or services from
a seller who "is affiliated with the creditor by common control
.. .'N" Although not defined in the rule, "common control"
refers to a situation where there is common ownership or other
organizational relationship between the seller and lender, such
as an interlocking directorate or joint management. The Guide-
lines state that common control exists when a seller and credi-
tor are functionally part of the same business entity.'47 It indi-
cates a continuing relationship, and there are strong arguments
for presuming that common control facilitates lender knowl-
edge of seller activities and potential for recourse arrange-
ments.
The seller may also be "affiliated" with the creditor by
contract. 4 ' "Contract" is defined as
[alny oral or written agreement, formal or informal, be-
tween a creditor and a seller, which contemplates or pro-
vides for cooperative or concerted activity in connection
with the sale of goods or services to consumers or the fi-
nancing thereof.'49
This definition encompasses agreements relating to the financ-
ing of the sale of goods or services, such as payment of consider-
ation to the seller for referral of consumer borrowers, recourse
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 20022.
146. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1976).
147. Guidelines, supra note 124, at 20025.
Some courts have found common control to be a factor, in connection with other
criteria, in determining the existence of a close relationship between a vendor and his
assignee. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
148. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1976).
149. Id. § 433.1(f).
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arrangements, and seller guarantees. It also includes financing
arrangements between the seller and lender where the lender
has a security interest in the proceeds of the seller's inventory,
including chattel paper.1° Evidence of a contractual relation-
ship regarding the financing of consumer purchases is certainly
proof that the lender has knowledge of the seller's activities
and potential to arrange for recourse agreements. In fact, any
financer of a seller's inventory will, in the ordinary course of
business, check the seller's records.' Further policing of the
seller's relationship with consumers should not produce an
additional burden for the financer, and holding such lenders
liable to consumer-purchasers is consistent with the policies of
risk allocation and policing the marketplace.
However, an informal contract between a merchant and
lender may also contemplate activity in connection with the
sale of goods or services to consumers unrelated to the financ-
ing of the sale.'52 Conceivably, a creditor might enter into a
contract to help finance an advertising campaign of the mer-
chant, without taking any security interest in the inventory
and proceeds. A contract of this sort does not affect the exten-
sion of credit to any customer of the seller, but it does contem-
plate activity connected with the sale of goods or services. Why
should this creditor be subject to the claims and defenses of a
consumer to whom he extends credit when a substantial part
of the proceeds of the loan are used to purchase an applicance
from this merchant? Since this creditor does not control the
way the proceeds of his loans are spent,'53 extending the rule
to such a creditor clearly cannot serve the policy of policing the
marketplace. Nor is the risk allocation policy furthered: a cred-
itor in this situation has no way of passing the cost to the
merchant. The creditor's absorption of the entire loss will re-
sult in increased credit rates and a reduction of independent
direct loans.
The "affiliation criterion" may also be met by a "business
arrangement,"'' 4 defined as "[any understanding, procedure,
course of dealing, or arrangement, formal or informal, between
a creditor and seller, in connection with the sale of goods or
150. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
151. Id.
152. N.Y.S.B.A. Comments, supra note 139, at 11-12.
153. FRB Comments, supra note 129, at 9-10.
154. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1976).
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services to consumers or the financing thereof.""'5 This includes
such circumstances as the exchange of forms between seller
and lender, direct payment of the proceeds of the loan by the
lender to the seller, and conditioning the loan on purchase from
a specified seller. It also includes any of the situations pre-
viously described that were not the product of a contractual
agreement. For example, a checking account with the creditor
in which the seller makes daily deposits of the cash income
from the sale of his goods might qualify as an "arrangement
. . .in connection with the sale of goods."' 56 A creditor with
such nebulous connections with the seller should not be sub-
ject to defenses a consumer may have against this seller when
he independently advances a loan, the proceeds of which (un-
known to the creditor) are used to purchase goods from the
seller. Suppose both consumer and seller have checking ac-
counts with the same lender. Does the lender make an inter-
locking loan whenever the consumer buys something from the
seller using the overdraft privileges he has with his checking
account?'5
The FTC's catch-all definition includes many other types
of "understandings" or "procedures" which a merchant may
have with a creditor that relate to the sale of his goods but
which do not relate at all to the consumer-creditor relationship,
and which have no bearing on the ability of the creditor to
absorb the losses that result from seller misconduct. The
Guidelines specifically state that a commercial checking ac-
count (as well as other general commercial arrangements such
as a commercial lease, a general business loan, or a credit card
agreement) does not invoke the rule. 5 ' Yet these activities all
fall within the concept of "affiliation" by contract or by "busi-
ness arrangement." If the Federal Trade Commission did not
intend the rule to cover these activities, the rule, not the Guide-
lines, should be the source for these exceptions.
While the FTC rule properly and legitimately covers many
situations where the creditor is in a position to have some re-
course arrangement with the merchant or to police his activi-
ties, its broad sweep also covers situations where this would not
be the case. In the area of preservation of consumer claims and
155. Id. § 433.1(g).
156. Id.
157. See FRB Comments, supra note 129, at 9-12.
158. Guidelines, supra note 124, at 20026.
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defenses, it is seller misconduct, not creditor misconduct,
which is the source of consumer problems. The disreputable
merchant assigns the retail installment contract or arranges for
an interlocking loan so he can take his money and run, leaving
the "innocent" financer and consumer to fight it out. By policy
decision, the risk is then placed upon the financer because he
can best bear the costs and distribute them among all consum-
ers. In any statutory scheme defining an interlocking loan, the
activities of the seller which connect the consumer with the
financing institution must be clearly outlined. The FTC rule
does not describe specific situations; it covers many standard
commercial relationships in which the seller has no role in the
consumer's obtaining cash and the lender has no knowledge of
how the proceeds of the loan will be spent. Thus, the financer
is called to account, even if he is without recourse to transfer
the cost to the seller and unable to learn of disreputable prac-
tices of particular merchants. The result can only be unrealisti-
cally high credit rates and a reduction in the availability of
direct credit,'59 with no appreciable gain for the consumer.
As noted previously, 60 the rule does not mandate that
creditors include the requisite notice in their loan contracts;
however, a merchant is in violation of the FTC Act when he
accepts the proceeds of a consumer credit contract which did
not contain the notice. Thus, a seller may be reluctant to ac-
cept any cash that might be the proceeds of a loan advanced
by a bank with whom the seller happens to deal. The seller
must first ask the consumer the source of his cash and examine
the loan contract to determine if it contains the FTC notice.
The seller is not only put in an absurd position, but the con-
sumer is subjected to the humiliating experience of protracted
questioning-even when he pays in cash! 6'
LIABILITY OF THE HOLDER
Once it is established that defenses and claims can be
asserted against the holder of a consumer credit contract in a
private action,6 2 what should be the extent of the holder's lia-
159. See opposition to the 1973 FTC Rule as described in FTC Statement, supra
note 56, at 53517. See also W.S.B.A. Letter, supra note 130, at 8; C.U.N.A. Letter,
supra note 139, at 15-22. The latter is an interesting discussion of the effect of the rule
on the credit union industry. It is noteworthy that credit unions, generally concerned
with the plight of the consumer, have taken a strong stand against the FTC rule.
160. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
161. FRB Comments, supra note 129, at 4-5.
162. See text accompanying notes 173-74 infra for a discussion of public remedies
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bility? As with the definition of an interlocking lender, consid-
eration must be given to the policies of risk allocation and
policing the market. 3 If the holder would be subjected to un-
limited liability arising from the sale or lease transaction6 4-all
consequential damages, including tort injury to the
consumer' -then the holder would in fact become the mer-
chant's liability insurer. Such a result would drastically in-
crease the price of credit and decrease its availability.
Another approach is to limit the holder's liability to the
total amount financed.'66 Unless the consumer has suffered
some consequential damages, this could result in unjust enrich-
ment to a purchaser who had only paid a small part of the
amount owing on the loan when the claim arose.' Another
problem with this measure of liability arises when the con-
sumer brings an action within the proper statute of limitations
but after the loan has been paid. At this point, it may be too
late for the lender to obtain recourse from the seller.'68 Because
of the uncertainty involved, this measure of liability may also
result in higher credit rates.
The UCCC limits the liability of the holder to the amount
owing on the contract.' The advantage of this measure of re-
covery is that it provides a built-in statute of limitations.'
0
However, such recovery is probably only beneficial to a con-
sumer who learns of a claim or defense soon after entering into
for violations of the FTC rule. The rule itself is not clear as to when a consumer can
assert claims and defenses against a holder of his consumer credit contract. Can the
consumer instigate an action against a holder for breach of contract as he could against
the merchant or must the consumer await an action by the finance company against
him and assert his claims only by way of defense?
163. Rohner, supra note 9, at 553.
164. MCCA § 2.603(1)-(2) provide that the assignee of a consumer credit obliga-
tion or an interlocking lender is liable to the full extent of all claims and defenses which
arise from the transaction unless the assignee receives the obligation in good faith and
without knowledge and unless the direct lender can show he did not know how the
proceeds of the loan were to be used. If either can be shown, liability is limited to the
total amount of the transaction.
165. There is no need to extend the liability of the holder to include personal
injury recovery. In many jurisdictions where the Second Restatement of Torts § 402A
is adopted, consumers can recover from the manufacturer for bodily injury proximately
caused by a dangerous product. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 656-58
(4th ed. 1971). For California law see Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
166. NCA § 2.407. See Appendix E infra.
167. Rohner, supra note 9, at 555.
168. Id.
169. 1974 UCCC § 3.405(2), (3). See Appendix B infra.
170. See W.S.B.A. Letter, supra note 130, at 10.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the loan obligation. If the claim arises when the loan is nearly
paid, the consumer has lost almost as much as one who pays
entirely in cash.
The FTC approach is the converse of limiting recovery to
the amount owing on the contract: liability is limited to the
amount already paid."' The consumer is no longer obligated on
his loan and he can recover whatever has already been paid to
the creditor. This is equivalent to a rescission of the loan agree-
ment. However, the consumer cannot claim consequential
damages. When the consumer claim is not pursued until the
obligation has been paid, or almost paid, the finance company
becomes potentially liable for an amount equal or nearly equal
to the full amount of the transaction. Because the FTC rule
contains no statute of limitations, a creditor may be liable for
this amount in perpetuity. Since the creditor is subject to all
claims, including tort claims, it is possible that he may be
liable (up to the amount paid) for a tort injury occuring many
years after the contract account has closed.
It is difficult to determine which degree of liability best
serves both the interest of the consumer and the right of the
finance company to protect against excessive losses. However,
it seems clear that in order to provide a measure of predictabil-
ity for the financer, a statutory limit on the amount and the
time period during which the holder is liable is desirable. This
would allow the creditor to determine the terms of the recourse
agreement with the seller and it would also keep the credit
rates down. Since federal remedies for a violation of the rule
do not preempt state law,' there is no reason why a court, in
proper circumstances, could not award recoveries beyond the
FTC limit.
IMPACT OF THE FTC RULE
The new enforcement powers granted to the FTC in the
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1975
strengthen the legislative mandate of the FTC trade regulation
rule. "3 The FTC is now empowered to bring civil actions to
obtain redress for consumers or others who have been injured
171. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a)-(b) (1976). The last sentence of the notice reads: "Re-
covery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereun-
der."
172. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b(e) (Supp. 1976).
173. 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
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by violations of rules defining unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices.' Of particular importance to consumers is the provision
that
[sluch relief may include, but shall not be limited to,
rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money
or return of property, the payment of damages, and public
notification respecting rule violation . . . .
However, these enforcement powers may be of little aid to a
consumer forced to continue payments for a broken appliance
or unreceived service.
The Commission relies heavily upon consumer complaints
to direct its attention to a particular act or practice in violation
of section 5. '71 Since there is no required notice to the consumer
of his rights under this rule,' 7 the consumer will not learn that
the holder's copy of his contract did not contain the FTC notice
until the holder initiates action against him.
What recourse does the consumer have? The courts have
established that an FTC rule does not provide a private right
of action.'78 The consumer can notify the FTC of the violation,
but if the seller has absconded, the Commission will be power-
less to enforce a penalty or to obtain redress. If the seller is still
in business, the FTC will probably take steps to enforce the
rule only when it learns that the seller is accepting a large
volume of such contracts and is thus affecting a significant
number of consumers. With a limited budget and an increasing
number of trade regulation rules to enforce,'79 it is unlikely that
the FTC will act on individual complaints. The consumer,
therefore, is in exactly the same position as he was before the
rule was promulgated: he must stop payments, either instigate
his own action or await action against him by the finance com-
pany, and then look to existing state law to determine if he can
assert claims and defenses against the lender.
It is difficult to evaluate the impact the FTC rule will have
upon state law. The amended FTC Act explicitly declares that
174. Id. § 57b(a)-(b).
175. Id. § 57b(b).
176. B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 212 (1972).
177. 1973 FTC Rule §§ 433.3, 433.4, supra note 83. The FTC decided that since
there was evidence that most consumers fail to read their contracts, a consumer notice
would be unnecessary. FTC Statement, supra note 56, at 53525-26.
178. Holloway v. Bristol Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
179. The FTC has recently promulgated 23 final trade regulation rules. 41 Fed.
Reg. 3322 (1976).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the remedies provided therein do not preempt other state or
federal law.1sa Therefore, states are free to fashion their own
remedies. Those states with provisions defining unfair acts or
practices similar to the FTC Act could add this rule to their
lists of such acts or practices.' States that do not have effec-
tive statutes barring cutoff devices or legislation dealing with
the interlocking lender may regard the FTC rule as an impetus
for drafting similar legislation."' The states may well provide
both public and private remedies which are far more effective,
given the limited ability of the FTC to enforce this rule.
It is uncertain how state courts will interpret the FTC rule
when a consumer attempts to assert a defense against the
holder of a contract which does not contain the FTC notice. Is
such a contract enforceable? According to the FTC, "The pur-
pose of the rule is to permit courts of competent jurisdiction to
examine equities where a consumer has a claim against the
seller."'' 3 A liberal court may consider a holder to be in bad
faith for taking a consumer credit contract that does not con-
tain the notice. On the other hand, assuming the contract does
contain the notice but the holder can show he had no relation-
ship with the merchant and no knowledge of where the pro-
ceeds of the loan were to be spent, a conservative court might
ignore the FTC notice.
Nor is it clear to what extent courts will be bound by the
FTC rule.' 4 It has been observed that because the FTC Act
does not show Congressional intent to supersede state law,
courts may be reluctant to permit FTC rulings to negate exist-
180. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b(e) (Supp. 1976).
181. Cf. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1770 (West Supp. 1976) which sets out a list of unfair
or deceptive acts or practices to which the FTC rule on preserving consumer claims
and defenses could be added. See also note 182 infra.
182. Erickson, supra note 9, at 259.
183. FTC Statement, supra note 56, at 53526.
184. In California the provisions dealing with unfair or deceptive acts or practices
are CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1770, 3369 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17000
et seq. (West 1964). The California courts have held that federal court decisions inter-
preting the FTC Act "are more than ordinarily persuasive" in interpreting CAL. CIv.
CODE § 3369 (West Supp. 1976). The similarity of the FTC Act and section 3369 "in
relation to unfair business practices indicates . . . a common purpose and must be
considered as supplementing each other rather than being in conflict." People v. Nat'l
Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 773, 777, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522, 524 (1962).
Therefore, it is likely that California courts will also look to federal decisions interpret-
ing the rule preserving consumer claims and defenses.
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ing state statutes." ' How the consumer will fare in his state
court remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
The inequity of a financer asserting holder in due course
status in many consumer transactions has long been recog-
nized. Many jurisdictions have attempted to preserve con-
sumer claims and defenses where the consumer credit contract
has been assigned to a third party. However, despite a number
of model proposals in the area, the interlocking lender loophole
has not been closed in most states.
The FTC rule is a federal attempt to abolish HDC status
of the assignee financer as well as to close the interlocking
lender loophole. Although many jurisdictions provide some
protection for the consumer whose credit contract has been
assigned, the coverage varies considerably from state to state.
The FTC rule is an attempt to provide uniformity in this area.
Moreover, since only a few states protect the consumer from
the interlocking lender, the FTC rule serves to fill a significant
void.
Unfortunately, the FTC rule spills over into unwarranted
areas, reaching innocent creditors and making them the guar-
antors of all consumer transactions where credit has been ex-
tended. Rather than draw on the carefully articulated propos-
als of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code or the Model Con-
sumer Credit Act, the FTC drafters designed a convoluted but
sweeping rule which could have an effect on consumer credit
that the drafters did not intend.
Principles of risk allocation and market policing demand
that the definition of "interlocking lender" be made clear and
precise. If this is not done, the protections consumers gain from
reform will be overshadowed by inevitable results: increased
costs and decreased availability of credit. In an attempt to
make a "flexible" rule, the FTC may have created a Pandora's
box.
This threat is made more troublesome by the FTC's in-
creased enforcement powers. On the other hand, even with its
new powers, the nature of the rule may make it difficult for the
FTC to detect violations until the harm to the consumer is
185. Comment, Consumer Protection: Proposed Federal Trade Commission
Rule-Preservation of Buyers' Claims and Defenses in Consumer Installment Sales,
21 J. PUB. L. 169, 187 (1972).
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nearly irremedial. The individual consumer may still be fight-
ing over the contract for his broken appliance while the FTC
is deciding whether (and how) to penalize a bankrupt mer-
chant.
It is laudable that the FTC chose to protect the borrowing
consumer confronted with the unassailable holder in due
course. However, this sweeping rule fails in its purpose. It is
hoped that the FTC will amend the rule entirely by returning
to the format it proposed in 1973, requiring a careful definition
of the interlocking lender, a consideration of risk allocation and
market policing, and a balancing of the interests of the con-
sumer with the realities of the credit industry.
Bonnie Packer
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Appendix A
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TRADE REGULATION RULE CONCERN-
ING PRESERVATION OF CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES*
Section 433.1 Definitions.
(a) Person. An individual, corporation, or any other busi-
ness organization.
(b) Consumer. A natural person who seeks or acquires
goods or services for personal, family, or household use.
(c) Creditor. A person who, in the ordinary course of
business, lends pruchase money or finances the sale of goods or
services to consumers on a deferred payment basis; Provided,
such person is not acting, for the purposes of a particular trans-
action, in the capacity of a credit card issuer.
(d) Purchase money loan. A cash advance which is re-
ceived by a consumer in return for a "Finance Charge" within
the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z,
which is applied, in whole or substantial part, to a purchase of
goods or services from a seller who (1) refers consumers to the
creditor or (2) is affiliated with the creditor by common control,
contract, or business arrangement.
(e) Financing a sale. Extending credit to a consumer in
connection with a "Credit Sale" within the meaning of the
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z.
(f) Contract. Any oral or written agreement, formal or
informal, between a creditor and a seller, which contemplates
or provides for cooperative or concerted activity in connection
with the sale of goods or services to consumers or the financing
thereof.
(g) Business arrangement. Any understanding, proce-
dure, course of dealing, or arrangement, formal or informal,
between a creditor and a seller, in connection with the sale of
goods or services to consumers or the financing thereof.
(h) Credit card issuer. A person who extends to cardhold-
ers the right to use a credit card in connection with purchases
of goods or services.
(i) Consumer credit contract. Any instrument which evi-
dences or embodies a debt arising from a "Purchase Money
Loan" transaction or a "financed sale" as defined in para-
graphs (d) and (e).
* 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1976).
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(j) Seller. A person who, in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, sells or leases goods or services to consumers.
Section 433.2 Preservation of Consumers' Claims and De-
fenses, Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices.
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to
consumers, in or affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined
in the Federal Trade Commission Act, it is an unfair or decep-
tive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5 of that Act
for a seller, directly or indirectly, to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which
fails to contain the following provision in at least ten point,
bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CON-
TRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PUR-
SUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF.
RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.
or, (b) Accept, as full or partial payment of such sale or lease,
the proceeds of any purchase money loan (as purchase money
loan is defined herein), unless any consumer credit contract
made in connection with such purchase money loan contains
the following provision in at least ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CON-
TRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH
THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY
THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID
BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
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Appendix B
SECTION 3.405 OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 1974
FINAL DRAFT
Section 3.405. Lender Subject to Claims and Defenses Aris-
ing from Sales and Leases.
(1) A lender, except the issuer of a lender credit card,
who, with respect to a particular transaction, makes a con-
sumer loan to enable a consumer to buy or lease from a particu-
lar seller or lessor property or services is subject to all claims
and defenses of the consumer against the seller or lessor arising
from that sale or lease of the property or services if:
(a) the lender knows that the seller or lessor ar-
ranged for the extension of credit by the lender for a com-
mission, brokerage, or referral fee;
(b) the lender is a person related to the seller or
lessor, unless the relationship is remote or is not a factor
in the transaction;
(c) the seller or lessor guarantees the loan or other-
wise assumes the risk of loss by the lender upon the loan;
(d) the lender directly supplies the seller or lessor
with the contract document used by the consumer to evi-
dence the loan, and the seller or lessor has knowledge of
the credit terms and participates in preparation of the
document;
(e) the loan is conditioned upon the consumer's pur-
chase or lease of the property or services from the particu-
lar seller or lessor, but the lender's payment of proceeds
of the loan to the seller or lessor does not in itself establish
that the loan was so conditioned; or
(f) the lender, before he makes the consumer loan,
has knowledge or, from his course of dealing with the par-
ticular seller or lessor or his records, notice of substantial
complaints by other buyers or lessees of the particular
seller's or lessor's failure or refusal to perform his contracts
with them and of the particular seller's or lessor's failure
to remedy his defaults within a reasonable time after no-
tice to him of the complaints.
(2) A claim or defense of a consumer specified in subsec-
tion (1) may be asserted against the lender under this section
only if the consumer has made a good faith attempt to obtain
satisfaction from the seller or lessor with respect to the claim
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
or defense and then only to the extent of the amount owing to
the lender with respect to the sale or lease of the property or
services as to which the claim or defense arose at the time the
lender has notice of the claim or defense. Notice of the claim
or defense may be given before the attempt specified in this
subsection. Oral notice is effective unless the lender requests
written confirmation when or promptly after oral notice is
given and the consumer fails to give the lender written confir-
mation within the period of time, not less than 14 days, stated
to the consumer when written confirmation is requested.
(3) For the purpose of determining the amount owing to
the lender, with respect to the sale or lease;
(a) payments received by the lender after consolida-
tion of two or more consumer loans, except pursuant to
open-end credit, are deemed to have been applied first to
the payment of the loans first made; if the loans consoli-
dated arose from loans made on the same day, payments
are deemed to have been applied first to the smallest loan;
and
(b) payments received for an open-end credit ac-
count are deemed to have been applied first to the pay-
ment of finance charges in the order of their entry to the
account and then to the payment of debts in the order in
which the entries of the debts are made to the account.
(4) An agreement may not limit or waive the claims or
defenses of a consumer under this section.
Appendix C
FACTORS PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
FINANCE FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTERLOCKING
LOAN*
(1) The lender supplied forms to the seller, lessor or sup-
plier of services which the consumer used in obtaining the loan.
(2) The seller, lessor or supplier prepared or assisted in
preparation of documents used to evidence the loan.
(3) The lender is related to or affiliated with the seller,
lessor or supplier of services.
* REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT
IN THE UNITED STATES 37-38 (1972).
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(a) With regard to individuals, "related to" refers to any
familial relationship;
(b) with regard to corporations, firms, partnerships,
trusts, and other organizations, "affiliated with" refers to
(1) direct or indirect control of or by any such organiza-
tion, (2) interlocking directorates or other form of joint or
common management of two or more organizations, or (3)
familial relationship with an officer, director, owner, part-
ner, trustee, or similar official of an organization.
(4) The lender directly or indirectly pays the seller, les-
sor, or supplier of services, any commissions, fees, or other
consideration measured by or based in any way on the con-
sumer loan.
(5) The lender has knowledge- including knowledge
from dealing with other customers of the seller, lessor or sup-
plier of services or knowledge from records or notices of com-
plaints by other such customers-that the seller, lessor, or sup-
plier of service failed to perform agreements with customers or
fails to remedy valid complaints.
(6) The lender has repeatedly and regularly made loans
in a 1-year period to finance purchases of goods or services from
the seller, lessor, or supplier of services, or persons related to
or organizations affiliated with the seller, lessor, or supplier of
services, and the lender was recommended to the consumer for
the loans in question.
Appendix D
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE
CONCERNING PRESERVATION OF CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
(1973)*
Section 433.1. Definitions.
(h) Related creditor. Any person, partnership, corporation,
or association, which is engaged in making loans to consumers
to enable payment to be made for consumer goods or services
and which either participates in or is directly connected with
the consumer transaction. Without limiting the scope of the
immediately preceding language, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that a creditor is a related creditor under any one
of the following circumstances:
* 38 Fed. Reg. 893 (1973).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
(1) The creditor is a person related by blood or marriage
to the seller or to the seller's spouse.
(2) The creditor prepared, supplied or furnished the
seller with the forms or documents used to evidence or secure
the consumer loan.
(3) The seller prepared, supplied or furnished the credi-
tor with the forms or documents used to evidence or secure the
consumer loan.
(4) The creditor is directly or indirectly controlled by,
under common control of, or is otherwise affiliated with the
seller.
(5) The creditor and the seller are engaged in a joint
venture to produce consumer obligations payable either di-
rectly or by transfer to the creditor.
(6) The creditor directly or indirectly pays the seller any
consideration for the referral of consumer borrowers.
(7) The seller guaranteed the consumer loan or otherwise
assumed the risk of loss by the creditor upon the loan.
(8) The creditor made five or more loans within a 1-year
period the proceeds of which are used in transactions with the
same seller following referral of the consumer to the creditor by
the seller.
(9) (i) The creditor knew or had reason to know that the
loan proceeds would be used in whole or in substantial part to
pay the seller for an obligation of the consumer, and (ii) the
creditor had notice that the seller failed or refused to perform
contracts with the consumers, or failed to remedy complaints
within a reasonable time.
Appendix E
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT
(1970)
Section 2.407 (Interlocking Loans and Sales)
(1) The creditor in consumer loan transactions shall be
subject to all of the claims and defenses of the consumer up to
the total amount financed, arising from the consumer sale or
lease for which the proceeds of the loan are used, if the creditor
participated in or was connected with the consumer sale or
lease transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of subsection (1), the
creditor participates in or is connected with a consumer sale or
lease transaction when:
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(a) the creditor is a person related to the seller or
lessor; or
(b) the seller or lessor prepares documents used in
connection with the loan; or
(c) the creditor supplies forms to the seller or lessor
used by the consumer in obtaining the loan; or
(d) the creditor makes 20 or more loans in any calen-
dar year, the proceeds of which are used in transactions
with the same seller or lessor, or with a person related to
the same seller or lessor; or
(e) the consumer is referred to the creditor by the
seller or lessor; or
(f) the creditor, directly or indirectly, pays the seller
or lessor any consideration whether or not it is in connec-
tion with the particular transaction; or
(g) the creditor is the issuer of a credit card which
may be used by the consumer in the consumer sale or lease
as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the
seller or lessor.
Appendix F
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT
ACT (1973)
Section 2.603 Liability of Lender and Transferee
(1) The lender who extends credit to a consumer in the
form of a loan and the transferee of that obligation is liable to
the consumer to the full extent of all claims, defenses and
equities of the consumer arising out of the consumer transac-
tion in which the proceeds of the loan are used, except as other-
wise provided in this Section.
(2) If the lender extends the loan or the transferee ac-
quires the obligation of the consumer in good faith, without
notice of any claims, defenses or equities and continues to act
in good faith throughout the transaction, the liability of the
lender or transferee shall not exceed the amount of the proceeds
of the loan used in the consumer transaction and, in addition,
any finance or other charges arising out of the loan which are
attributable to that amount.
(3) The lender or transferee of the lender has no liability
pursuant to this Section if
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
(a) with respect to the lender who acts in good faith he
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he did
not know and had no reason to know that the proceeds of
the loan, or any part of them, would be used in a consumer
transaction, or
(b) with respect to the transferee who acts in good faith
he establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the
lender would have qualified for exemption from liability
under subsection (3)(a) and that the transferee did not
know and had no reason to know that the proceeds or any
part of the loan were used in a consumer transaction.
(4) Without limiting the scope of the inquiry pursuant to
subsection (3) regarding the knowledge or reason to know of the
lender, the lender will be deemed to have knowledge that the
proceeds of a loan will be used in a consumer transaction when
(a) the lender is a person related to the seller; or
(b) the lender supplies to the seller or the seller prepares
documents used to evidence the loan obligation of the con-
sumer; or
(c) the lender has recourse to the seller for nonpayment
of the loan through guaranty, reserve account or other-
wise; or
(d) the lender directly or indirectly pays to the seller any
commission, fee or other consideration based upon the
assistance or cooperation of the seller in the obtaining of
the loan; or
(e) the lender makes payment of the proceeds of the loan
to the seller either individually or jointly with the con-
sumer; or
(f) the lender conditions the extension of credit upon the
purchase of goods or services from the seller; or
(g) the lender knew or should have known that the loan
was arranged by the seller or a person acting on behalf of
the seller; or
(h) the lender and seller participate in any arrangement,
formal or otherwise, in which the seller refers consumers
to the lender; or
(i) the lender permits the reference to his services to be
used by the seller in connection with the consumer trans-
actions; or
(j) the lender takes a security interest in the property
which is the subject of the consumer transaction; or
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(k) the lender otherwise participates in or is connected
with the consumer transaction.
(5) The lender has the right, without penalty, to rescind
a loan commitment if the consumer has not irrevocably obli-
gated himself in reliance upon the commitment and if, after
the commitment is made but before the loan is extended, the
lender acquires knowledge of facts giving rise to a substantial
risk of liability which risk was not known at the time the com-
mitment was initially made and he thereupon promptly gives
the consumer notice of the facts and of the election to rescind
the contract.

